Five years on: the European Defence Agency

10 July 2009

Few Europeans have heard of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which celebrates its fifth anniversary this month. This little-known European Union agency has slowly created a basis for the development of common military projects, though its progress has been slow, due to diverging national interests in the areas of procurement and defence, writes Frank Slijper. The EDA was established on 12 July 2004. The end of the Cold War had changed perspectives on European defence, while emerging conflicts – especially in the Balkans, but also outside Europe – gave a significant impetus to increased military co-operation. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) developed rapidly, and was one of the main drivers towards the EU Constitution, while out-of-area operations have mushroomed over the past few years. The statement in the EU Constitution (and now in the Lisbon Treaty) that “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities” is directly linked to the EDA's establishment. Such statements have raised questions over Europe's ultimate military aims. Further questions have been raised by the EDA mantra that “we need to spend more and to spend better”. Its claims that military co-operation would lead to rationalised forces and thus save money, have not proved credible. Talking big Pronouncements by EU leaders have encouraged the view that the EDA is part of a more aggressive European military outlook. French President Nicolas Sarkozy argued that “Europe cannot be a dwarf in terms of defence and a giant in economic matters.” Greek defence minister Papantoniou said in 2003: “we [Europe] must strengthen our presence, especially in the defence field, in order for the United States to view us seriously.” Curiously, he saw the main obstacle being “that after the Cold War there is no strong threat. We have to overcome this problem.” With Javier Solana, High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), at its helm, the EDA was guaranteed political support. “The need to bolster Europe's military capabilities to match our aspirations is more urgent than ever. And so, too, is the need for us to respond better to the challenges facing our defence industries. This Agency can make a huge difference,” Solana said. But the EDA's aims have not been matched by its achievements – so far. According to its first chief executive, Nick Witney, the EDA “will stand or fall ultimately with the success in attracting, maintaining and fostering the interest and support of the participating states” [i.e. all EU members except Denmark]. And that is exactly where most of the EDA’s problems have arisen. For instance, the French want a bigger budget, but Britain doesn’t approve: “We don’t back a budget without seeing what we are paying for,” a British official was quoted as saying. Limited progress In practice, the EDA's work so far has largely involved strategy mapping. There has been very limited progress in the more difficult business of getting substantial and concrete projects off the ground – for example, in the area of armaments co-operation. Among the more tangible achievements has been the EDA’s growing involvement in technology research projects, both under its own flag, as well as through the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme (FP7) security research budget. This shows the EDA can win acceptance as a leader in such common projects, and also indicates a shifting focus towards the broader security context, including border control and less lethal weapons. The EDA is cashing in on the abundance of EU funding and political will. Probably most significant has been the EDA's cooperation with the European Commission in the move towards a borderless market for the European defence industry. The Commission finalised in late 2008 two related defence directives: one dealing with more competitive procurement by member states, the second outlining a new regime under which export controls of intra-community transfers of military goods would be greatly simplified. Civil society organisations have rightly argued that the second draft directive undoes much of the progress made over the past years on transparency in relation to arms exports. More importantly, they have warned that such a directive might lead to weapons leaving EU territory through countries that maintain less-restrictive interpretations of the commonly agreed criteria on arms exports, as licence applications are still decided upon by national governments. The EDA has thus become a central part of the evolving European Security and Defence Policy, but it is too early to say if it will really become fundamental to an increasingly militarised EU. Doubtless, structurally diverging national interests will continue to be a major barrier. The fact that the EDA has remained largely invisible to most people is deeply problematic. The referenda rejecting the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty showed that European citizens can view negatively the EU's rapidly developing security and defence policies. Continuing on the road to further EU military integration, including the special role for the EDA, without broad public consultation and serious public debate, risks further undermining trust in the wider European project. Frank Slijper is a senior researcher at the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel and associate of the Transnational Institute (TNI) in Amsterdam. This article is provided as an op-ed and reflects the opinions of the author alone.

 

< Prev		Next >